Lisbon, Portugal. July 20-23, 2026.
ISSN: 2334-1033
ISBN: 978-1-956792-18-8
Copyright © 2026 International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
Inspired by revealed preference in economics, we study revealed epistemic trust: an agent’s (dis)trust in an information source is typically hidden, while her accept/reject behavior leaves observable traces. We model such traces by an acceptance function that maps each reported set of formulas to the subset the agent accepts. We develop two complementary models: a white-list mode, where acceptance is supported by trusted information in the report, and a black-list mode, where acceptance avoids distrusted patterns via a cautious remainder-set/full-meet construction. For both modes, we provide postulate-based representation theorems and show how canonical "revealed" trust and distrust cores can be reconstructed from the acceptance function itself.