KR2021Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and ReasoningProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

Online event. November 3-12, 2021.

Edited by

ISSN: 2334-1033
ISBN: 978-1-956792-99-7

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Published by

Copyright © 2021 International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

  1. Bastien Maubert(University of Naples Federico II)
  2. Munyque Mittelmann(IRIT, Université de Toulouse 1 Capitole)
  3. Aniello Murano(University of Naples Federico II)
  4. Laurent Perrussel(IRIT, Université de Toulouse 1 Capitole)


  1. Modeling and reasoning about preferences
  2. KR and autonomous agents and multi-agent systems


Mechanism Design aims at defining mechanisms that satisfy a predefined set of properties, and Auction Mechanisms are of foremost importance. Core properties of mechanisms, such as strategy-proofness or budget-balance, involve: (i) complex strategic concepts such as Nash equilibria, (ii) quantitative aspects such as utilities, and often (iii) imperfect information,with agents’ private valuations. We demonstrate that Strategy Logic provides a formal framework fit to model mechanisms, express such properties, and verify them. To do so, we consider a quantitative and epistemic variant of Strategy Logic. We first show how to express the implementation of social choice functions. Second, we show how fundamental mechanism properties can be expressed as logical formulas,and thus evaluated by model checking. Finally, we prove that model checking for this particular variant of Strategy Logic can be done in polynomial space.